This paper presents MCMAS, a model checker for Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). Differently from traditional model checkers, MCMAS permits the automatic verification of specifications that use epistemic, correctness, and cooperation modalities, in addition to the standard temporal modalities. These additional modalities are used to capture properties of various scenarios (including communication and security protocols, games, etc.) that may be difficult or unnatural to express with temporal operators only; a small number of applications are presented in Section 4. Agents are described in MCMAS by means of the dedicated programming language ISPL (Interpreted Systems Programming Language). The approach is symbolic and uses ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs), thereby extending standard techniques for temporal logic to other modalities distinctive of agents. MCMAS and all the examples presented in this paper are available for download [14] under the terms of the GPL license.
Theoretical background
Interpreted systems [5] provide the formal semantics for MCMAS programs. In the formalism of interpreted systems, each agent is characterised by a set of local states and by a set of local actions that are performed following a local protocol. Given a set of initial states, the system evolves in compliance with an evolution function that determines how the local state of an agent changes as a function of its local state and of the other agents' actions. The evolution of all the agents' local states describes a set of runs and a set of reachable states. These can be used to interpret formulae involving temporal operators, epistemic operators to reason about what agents know, operators to reason about the correct behaviour of the agents, and ATL operators expressing states of affairs that agents can enforce. Due to space limitations, we refer to [5, 13, 10, 1, 7] for a detailed presentation of this formalism, and for theoretical results on completeness, decidability, complexity, etc.
Interpreted systems' specifications can be given by means of ISPL programs: a simple example is depicted in Figure 1 (a) . We refer to the files available online for the full syntax of ISPL.
Given an interpreted system and a formula in the syntax of ISPL, MCMAS computes the set of states in which the formula holds and compares it to the set of reachable states. The methodology used to calculate this set extends the standard fix-point boolean characterisation for temporal operators [4] to epistemic, correctness, and cooperation operators. We refer to [15] for more details.
Implementation
Figure 1 (b) shows the structure of the implementation of MCMAS. The tool can be run from the command line and accepts various options to modify verbosity, to inspect OBDDs statistics [16] 
Examples and experimental results
Various ISPL programs are available for download from [14] . We consider here three of them to illustrate different verification scenarios. Communication protocol: the bit transmission protocol with faults. In this example from [5] , an agent (the Sender) wants to communicate the value of a bit to another agent (the Receiver) using a faulty line that may drop messages. To achieve this, the Sender starts sending messages to the Receiver; when the Receiver receives the bit, it starts sending acknowledgements back to the Sender. The protocol terminates when the Sender receives the acknowledgement. This scenario can be described in terms of interpreted systems, and it is easy to verify with MCMAS the key specification of the protocol: recack → AG(K S (K R (bit).) This formula expresses formally that, upon receipt of an acknowledgement, the Sender will forever know that the Receiver knows the value of the bit. This scenario is extended in [11] to include faulty behaviours of the Receiver. In particular, it is possible to model two faulty scenarios. In the first one, the Receiver "forgets" to send acknowledgements when it receives the bit. In the second scenario, the Receiver may send faulty acknowledgements without receiving the bit first. It is possible to verify with MCMAS the key specification of the protocol still holds in the first case, but it fails in the second. More complex specifications, referring explicitly to violations in the local behaviours, can also be verified.
Strategic games: a simple card game. This example is presented in [8] and in [9] : an agent (the player) plays a simple card game against another agent, the environment. There are just three cards in the deck: Ace (A), King (K), and Queen (Q); A wins over K, K wins over Q, and Q wins over A. In the initial state no cards are distributed; in the first step, the environment gives a card to the player and takes a card for itself. In the second step, the player can either keep its card, or change it. The following ATL formula can be checked by MCMAS: player F (win). The formula expresses that the player may always bring about a winning state, by randomly selecting the correct action. In addition to this, MCMAS supports an operator that considers only feasible strategies in the sense of [9, 8] . These are strategies that cannot be "guessed". MCMAS correctly verifies that in this example the player does not have a feasible strategy to win.
Anonymity example: the protocol of the dining cryptographers. The protocol of the dining cryptographers is introduced in [3] to describe a scenario in which information is exchanged anonymously. The scenario consists of three cryptographers having dinner at a restaurant. When the waiter informs them that the charge has been covered already, they would like to find out whether it is one of them, or the company they work for who paid for it. In order to guarantee the anonymity of the payer (in case it is one of them), they proceed as follows: each of them flips a coin behind a menu on the right hand side of his dish and observes this coin and the coin at his left (flipped by another cryptographer). If the cryptographer did not pay for the dinner, then he announces whether the two coins he can see are equal or different. However, if the cryptographer paid for the dinner, he says the opposite of what he sees. It is possible to check that, if a cryptographer did not pay for the dinner and he hears an odd number of "different" utterances, then he knows that one of the remaining cryptographers paid for the dinner, but he cannot say who. This property is captured by the following formula:
Notice that the same protocol works for any number of cryptographers greater or equal than three, thereby allowing for an evaluation of the scalability of MCMAS. The ISPL code for various instances of the protocol, including some in which cheating cryptographers are introduced, is available form [14] .
Discussion
Differently from previous approaches [2] , MCMAS does not involve the translation nor the reduction of the model checking problem for MAS to other available model checkers. Our technique is based on OBDDs but, differently from [6] , we consider various modalities on top of the epistemic and the temporal ones, and our semantics does not assume perfect recall. The tool presented in [12] allows for the verification of temporal, epistemic, and correct behaviour operators but, differently form MCMAS, it uses bounded and un-bounded techniques, and it has a different input language.
Average experimental results for the example of the dining cryptographers on a 2.8 GHz Pentium 4 running Linux 2.4.20 with 1 Gbytes of RAM are presented in Table 1 . We see these results as encouraging, considering that optimisation techniques have not been included in MCMAS yet, and that the code is currently under active development. In particular, we aim at including fairness constraints in the verification process, and counter-example generation for false formulae. 
